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"PROPER SUBJECTS FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT?"
ADDICTION, PRISON-BASED DRUG TREATMENT, AND THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
David Lebowitz*
ABSTRACT:
The Supreme Court has held that deliberate indiference to prisoners'
serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. This article argues that, because both
courts and the medical community have consistently acknowledged that
addiction is a disease, there may well be a basis in constitutional law for
people in prison to claim a constitutional right to prison-based drug
treatment.
"Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the
'crime' of having a common cold."
-Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, Robinson v. California'
I. INTRODUCTION
As early as 1908, Dr. Charles W. Carter wrote in the Journal of
Inebriety that morphine addiction "is not an immorality, but according to
the most advanced medical thought a physical or psychophysical disorder,
or a condition of disease"; he predicted "an approaching unanimity of
opinion among the most diligent observers" concerning the
characterization of drug addiction as a disease. 2 History has in large part
* J.D., Yale Law School, 2012. I am grateful to all of the teachers and classmates whose insights about
criminal justice, prisoners' rights, and the law's treatment of drugs helped shape the views expressed in this
essay. Special thanks to Professor Jeffrey Fagan for his thoughtful guidance. Any errors are exclusively my
own.
1. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
2. Charles W. Carter, What is the Morphine Disease?, 30 J. INEBIIETY 28 (1908), reprinted in DAVID
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vindicated Dr. Carter's prognostication. By 1961, the Joint Committee of
the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association on
Narcotic Drugs reported that "[t]he narcotic drug addict because of his
physical and psychological dependence on drugs and because of his
frequently abnormal personality patterns should be as much a subject of
concern to medicine and public health as to those having to do with law
enforcement."' These two conceptions of addiction-as both an
epidemiological and criminological concern-continue to co-exist in the
American psyche, competing for predominance.
An immense proportion of individuals under the supervision of the
criminal justice system in the United States are drug addicts or users.
According to the Justice Department's Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring
Program (ADAM), in half of reporting cities, 64% or more of the adult
male arrestees had recently used cocaine, opiates, marijuana,
methamphetamine, or PCP; New York had the highest rate at 80%.4 In
surveys administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, approximately
70% of state and 57% of federal prisoners reported regular past drug
abuse; this figure was up from about 62% and 42% respectively since
1991.sMany of those in custody-about 57% of state prisoners and 45% of
federal prisoners-reported using drugs in the month before their arrest.'
The Office of National Drug Control Policy reports that among male
prisoners, 22.7% of federal inmates and 32.1% of state inmates report
being under the influence of drugs when they committed their offense. For
women prisoners the numbers are 19.3% of federal inmates and 40.4% of
state inmates.
Clearly, drug prohibition is bound up inextricably with the explosion
of incarceration in the United States in recent decades. Approximately 6.3
million American adults, or just over 3% of the adult population, were
under the supervision of the criminal justice system (i.e. either
incarcerated, on parole, or on probation) as of 1999.8 Drug offenders
MUSTO, DRUGS IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 239, 240 (2002).
3. JOINT COMM. OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N AND THE AM. MED. Ass'N ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, DRUG
ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE? 159-66 (1961), reprinted in MUSTO, DRUGS IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at
284.
4. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, ANNUAL REPORT 2000:
ARRESTEE DRUG ABUSE MONITORING 7 (2000) [hereinafter ADAM REPORT].
5. U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT, STATE
AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1997 3-4 (1999), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/satsfp97.pdf.
6. Id.
7. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG TREATMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2
(March 2001) [hereinafter ONDCP, DRUG TREATMENT].
8. Id. at 1.
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comprised 21% of the state prison population and an impressive 59% of
the federal prison population.' By contrast, in 1980 drug offenders were
only 6% of the state prison population and 25% of the federal prison
population."o This increase is the result of a steep uptick in enforcement,
with drug arrests peaking at 1,889,810 in 2006." It is not related to any
dramatic increase in drug use among Americans, which has actually fallen
since 1979 among many demographics and has risen only modestly in
others.12
This paper will not comment on the justice of mass incarceration or
prohibitionist policies. It is, however, premised upon the relatively
uncontroversial claim that many Americans are in prison because they are
addicted to drugs. While it is difficult to estimate how many individuals
under the supervision of the criminal justice system are drug-dependent-
both because a definition of exactly who is addicted is difficult to specify
and because self-reporting about addiction is notoriously unreliable-
studies suggest that many of the drug users in prison are addicts or at risk
of addiction. Between a quarter and half of the arrestees at each ADAM
site were found to be at risk for drug dependence." Many of those
incarcerated in state or federal prisons committed property crimes and
thefts committed for the purpose of obtaining drugs, a course of action
considered indicative of drug addiction.14
Drug treatment in prison may be essential, precisely because those
whose addictions lead to arrest are disproportionately poor and unlikely to
have had access to effective treatment. Fewer than one in ten arrestees
surveyed by ADAM said they had received inpatient drug or alcohol
treatment-for example, detoxification, rehabilitation, therapeutic
community admission, or treatment in a hospital-in the past year."
Prison, then, may be the only place where severely addicted individuals
can access help. Yet according to one estimate, drug and alcohol
treatment was available in only about four of every ten federal, state, and
local correctional facilities as of 1997, with 173,000 total inmates in
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN AMERICA: FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 2006
(2007), available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/dataltable_29.html.
12. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG USE TRENDS 1 (October 2002).
13. ADAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
14. ONDCP, DRUG TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 2.
15. ADAM REPORT, supra note 4, at 25. Interestingly, in half the sites, at least 29% reported ever having
been in inpatient treatment, a relatively high figure potentially attributable to time spent in detoxification
programs. Id.
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treatment.16 This number may seem substantial, but it pales in comparison
to the number of individuals in prison who need treatment. One survey of
state prison systems indicates that 70 to 85% of inmates "need some level
of substance abuse treatment" while "less than 11% of the inmate
population" is receiving treatment.17
While incarceration generally has an extremely poor record of
deterring drug use," drug treatment in prison has been empirically shown
to reduce recidivism." According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, only
3.3% of residential drug treatment graduates are likely to be rearrested in
the first six months after release, compared to 12.1% of inmates who did
not receive treatment. 20 Among treatment graduates, 20.5% used drugs in
the first six months after release, compared with 36.7% of those without
treatment. 2 1 Overall, "[r]eviews of hundreds of studies of in-prison
rehabilitation programs reveal a small, but statistically reliable effect of
approximately a ten percentage-point reduction in recidivism, reducing
recidivism on average from 55% to 45%.",22 This figure, while modest, is
significant. Furthermore, this ten percent drop in recidivism is attributable
to drug treatment generally. Evidence suggests that in-prison drug
treatment done correctly-with appropriate funding, effective treatment
modalities, and proper administration-can reduce recidivism by up to
25% or 30%.23 A society that views addicts as disease sufferers-or
indeed, one that takes seriously the idea of using the criminal justice
system to reduce crime-must surely heed the evidence of prison-based
treatment's effectiveness.
Yet jurisdictions around the country are cutting treatment in prisons
rather than increasing it. The unprecedented growth in prison populations
16. ONDCP, DRUG TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 2.
17. Id. at 3. Available treatment modalities include residential therapeutic communities, pharmacological
maintenance (methadone, naltrexone and others), outpatient and other forms of counseling, aftercare
(including 12-step programs), and alternative approaches such as acupuncture. Id. at 3-4. For an overview
of corrections-based treatment models, see Roger H. Peters, Drug Treatment in Jails and Detention
Settings, in DRUG TREATMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1993).
18. See generally Dess Aldredge Grangetto, Reducing Recidivism by Substance Abusers Who Commit
Drug and Alcohol Related Crimes, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 383 (1999).
19. This discussion is limited to drug treatment in prison, and not treatment as an alternative to
incarceration as administrated through drug courts or other alternative criminal justice institutions.
20. ONDCP, DRUG TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 4.
2 1. Id.
22. David B. Marlowe, Symposium: New Voices in the War on Drugs: Effective Strategies for Intervening
with Drug Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REv. 989, 998 (2002).
23. Id at 999. "These exemplary programs employ professionally trained staff, serve higher-risk offenders,
provide structured behavioral or cognitive-behavioral treatments and focus on the specific attributes of
offenders that bear directly on their risk for recidivism, such as antisocial attitudes, impulsivity, sensation-
seeking behaviors and negative peer group associations." Id.
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nationwide has coincided with substantial declines in the availability of
drug treatment. "Of the almost 1.4 million individuals in prison
nationwide in 2001, only 120,687 were receiving drug treatment while
incarcerated." 24 The availability of prison-based treatment varies widely
by state, with some jurisdictions having effectively eliminated it
altogether. Only 0.5% of inmates in Louisiana were in treatment as of
2001, while "several other states had rates below 5%-including the
largest state prison system, California, with only 3.9% in treatment."2 5 In
1992, around the height of the crack cocaine "epidemic," 15.9% of
American prisoners were in drug treatment; by 2001, the number had been
almost halved to just 8.7%.26 By 2006, the National Center on Addiction
and Substance Abuse at Columbia University (CASA) estimated that only
about 11% of prisoners with substance abuse problems were receiving
needed prison-based treatment, and that most such treatment was not
"evidence-based." 27 Researchers at the National Institute on Drug Abuse
and the National Development and Research Institutes have estimated
somewhat more optimistically that "32% of state and 21% of federal
substance-involved prisoners had participated in treatment while under
correctional supervision," but noted the severe need for the expansion of
such programs.28 In addition, although about 70% of state prisoners are in
need of treatment for drug addiction, "45% of state prisons and 68% of
jails have no treatment of any kind. Moreover, only 22% of all prisons
provided treatment in segregated settings, the modality of treatment which
research shows is the most effective."29 This suggests that access to
treatment is heavily concentrated in a few places, with many prisoners
lacking any addiction programming at all. State budget cuts during the
recent recession have left prison-based treatment even sparser. As
treatment in prison is often a precondition of parole for drug offenders,
these cuts are likely to increase recidivism while simultaneously
24. William D. Bales et al, Policy Research Bulletin: Substance Abuse Treatment in Prison and
Community Reentry: Breaking the Cycle of Drugs, Crime, Incarceration, and Recidivism?, 13 GEO. J.
POVERTY L. & POLY 383, 387-88 (2006).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., BEHIND BARS 11:
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA'S PRISON POPULATION 40, 42 (February 2010), available at
http://www.casacolumbia.org/download.aspx?path=/UploadedFiles/twOt55j5.pdf [hereinafter CASA].
28. Bennet W. Fletcher & Harry K. Wexler, National Criminal Justice Drug Abuse Treatment Studies (CJ-
DA TS): Update and Progress, 23 THE JRSA FORUM 3,(2005), available at
http://www.cjdats.org/Documents/CJDATS%20Article%20only_20060414.pdf.
29. H.K. Wexler, The Promise of Prison-Based Treatment for Dually Diagnosed Inmates, 25 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 223, 224 (2003).
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lengthening prison terms.30
This paper seeks to highlight the apparent incongruity of a society
that imposes criminal punishment on hundreds of thousands of people
whose crimes arise out of what is considered in the national culture to be
an illness and then eviscerates the very programs that treat that illness. In
examining this question, I focus on the narrower issue of drug treatment in
prison in the context of federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Arguing that the case-law concerning addiction treats it largely as a
disease for legal purposes, I argue that the Supreme Court's "deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs" standard for establishing cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment may provide
grounds for a constitutional challenge to the elimination of prison-based
drug treatment.
Addiction presents an intriguing vehicle to examine the various
theories that underlie the criminal justice system. Conventional wisdom
considers addicts particularly difficult to deter, as their illness is thought to
render them incapable of properly evaluating rational disincentives to
commit crime. Even those who would justify mass incarceration of drug
users with a rehabilitation-based theory of criminal justice surely bear the
burden of proving that incarceration results in desistance from drug use-
at least among some convicts. With these issues in mind, I will seek to
address three broad questions in what follows. In Section II, I very briefly
review the literature on addiction, seeking to situate in context (if not to
answer) the question of whether addiction is a disease. Second, I trace the
development of federal jurisprudence concerning addiction, noting that
much of the relevant case law treats addiction as a disease. Third, I
examine whether the predominant disease model of addiction implicates
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on the provision of medical care in
prisons. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the interplay between
legal and medical understandings of addiction and of disease in general.
II. THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ADDICTION
I begin with a brief overview of the theory of addiction that has risen
to predominance in the United States over the past century: the so-called
"disease concept." This review of the literature on addiction is necessarily
brief as it covers a wide array of issues over a substantial period of time.
As such, I have intentionally limited the discussion go into depth only
30. Jeff Carlton and Nigel Duara, Budget Problems Forcing Prisons to Cut Counseling, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, April 15, 2010.
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where necessary to illuminate the law's treatment of addiction, to which I
turn in Section III.
A. Addiction, Drug Control, and the Disease Concept in America:
A Brief History
America's history with drugs is long and complex, but the general
trend in popular conceptions of drug use has been away from moralism,
and toward medicalization. When drug addiction was first recognized as a
social phenomenon in the United States, it was generally seen as a moral
failure, in no small part because of the strong association between drugs
and socially marginal populations."1 As David Musto notes, "[i]n the
nineteenth century addicts were identified with foreign groups and internal
minorities who were already actively feared and the objects of elaborate
and massive social and legal restraints"-most notably "the Chinese and
the Negroes."32
In the years preceding the passage of the first federal drug laws, both
the popular media and medical publications commonly linked drug
abuse-especially the "cocaine habit"-to the putatively morally dubious
African-Americans population in the South, while viewing white drug use
as presumptively medical. One physician wrote that while whites often
insufflated cocaine "on account of its contractile effects on the nasal
mucosa," this medical use was unavailing for blacks "as the nasal passages
of the negro are normally quite patulous;" black cocaine users in the South
instead snorted the drug "on account of its exhilarating effects."" In the
first years of the twentieth century, the Journal of the American Medical
Association repeatedly editorialized that Southern African-Americans
were disproportionately addicted to cocaine.3 4 The popular press,
meanwhile, was rife with sensationalized accounts of a drug-fueled black-
on-white crime wave engulfing the South. In 1903, the New York Tribune
published a statement by anti-drug crusader Colonel J. W. Watson
claiming that "many of the horrible crimes committed in the Southern
States by the colored people can be traced directly to the cocaine habit."
The Atlanta Constitution published claims by the police chief of Atlanta
31. This seems to be true of almost all substances now considered "drugs of abuse," with the exception of
alcohol, which has enjoyed a prominent place in American culture since the days of the Puritans. See
MUSTO, DRUGS IN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 14.
32. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 5 (1987) [hereinafter
MusTo, AMERICAN DISEASE].
33. W. Scheppegrell, The Abuse and Dangers of Cocaine, 73 THE MED. NEWS 417, 421 (1898).
34. See, e.g., Editorial, The Cocaine Habit, 34 JAMA 1637 (1900).
35. MUSTO, supra note 32, at 282 .
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that seventy percent of crimes were caused by drug use among blacks."6
Often, reports about rampant drug use among Southern blacks explicitly
linked cocaine to the rape of white women. One physician testified before
Congress that "most of the attacks upon white women of the South are the
direct result of a cocaine-crazed negro brain."" Even the New York Times
got in on the act, publishing an essay claiming that "cocaine orgies" were
leading blacks to commit "wholesale murders"-an especially alarming
threat considering the author's claims that cocaine use improves
marksmanship and imparts resistance to bullets."
The reality is that technological advances such as the isolation of
cocaine from coca in 1860, the synthesis of heroin from morphine in 1874,
and the invention and perfection of the hypodermic syringe in the latter
half of the nineteenth century had increased the availability of drugs at all
registers of society.39 As a result, "[b]y 1900 America had developed a
comparatively large addict population, perhaps 250,000" that reached
across divides of race and sex.40 Nonetheless, expert testimony before
Congress frequently focused on the racial dimension of drug addiction. In
response to the growing fear of an addiction crisis, that mapped onto a
crisis of the social order,, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act in
1906 and the Harrison Act in 1914.41 While use of many recreational
drugs declined in subsequent decades, drugs returned with a vengeance in
the 1960s and 1970s as marijuana became a staple of youth counter-
culture, and many Vietnam veterans returned from abroad addicted to
heroin.42 For much of the second half of the twentieth century, drug use
gradually increased while penalties for drug infractions and enforcement
of drug laws shot up dramatically.43
The history of Americans' conceptions of addiction is perhaps more
complicated. The notion that frequent morphine users could develop a
"habit" surfaced around 1870 in Great Britain. 44  By the turn of the
century, addiction was firmly situated as a medical issue, with research in
the United States and Europe focusing on tolerance and withdrawal.45
36. Id.
37. Quoted in M. Schatzmann, Cocaine and the Drug Problem, 7 J. PSYCHEDELIC DRUGS 9 (1975).
38. Edward Huntington Williams, Negro Cocaine "Fiends" New Southern Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1914.
39. MUSTO, supra note 2, at 183.
40. MUSTO, supra note 32, at 5.
41. MUSTO, supra note 2, at 187.
42. Id. at 183-93.
43. Id. at 189-93.
44. MUSTO, supra note 32, at 77.
45. Id. at 75-7.
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Proposed "cures" for addiction abounded, including the suggestion that
sufferers drink a tea made from ash tree bark.46 In the early 1920s the
medical establishment briefly changed its tune and began to argue, under
the influence of psychoanalytical theory, that addiction was merely a
manifestation of psychic dysfunction." By the late 1920s, however, the
medical community had largely abandoned the psychoanalytical
perspective toward addiction, focusing instead on a theory of physical
chemical dependence. Around this time the federal government
established institutions known as "narcotic farms" in Lexington,
Kentucky, and Fort Worth, Texas, to provide treatment for addicts, who
were beginning to overcrowd the federal prison system.48 While these
institutions were initially touted as potential testing grounds for innovative
addiction treatments,49 no very effective medical "cure" for addiction has
been discovered, despite efforts at developing one that continue to this
day.
B. The Disease Concept
The so-called "disease concept" of addiction has become the
predominant theory of chemical dependence in the United States, both
within the therapeutic community and in society at large. First elaborated
by E.M. Jellinek in 1946, the "disease concept" theory refers simply to the
notion that addiction is an illness." Today, most scientists who ascribe to
the disease concept characterize addiction as a "brain disease," caused by
disordered functioning of neurological reward systems. Recent
scholarship has attempted to generalize the disease concept to arrive at a
unified theory of addiction applicable to dependence on a wide range of
chemical substances. Alan Leshner, for instance, writes that:
virtually all drugs of abuse have common effects, either directly
or indirectly, on a single pathway deep within the brain-the
mesolimbic reward system. Activation of this system appears to
be a common element in what keeps users taking drugs. This
activity is not unique to any one drug; all addictive substances
46. Id. at 81.
47. Id. at 83.
48. Id. at 85.
49. For a history of the Lexington narcotic hospital and a detailed discussion of the search for an addiction
"cure" within the criminal justice model in twentieth century America, see generally NANCY D. CAMPBELL
ET AL, THE NARCOTIC FARM: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICA'S FIRST PRISON FOR DRUG ADDICTS
(2008).
50. E. M. Jellinek, Phases in the Drinking History ofAlcoholics, 7 Q.J. STUD. ALCOHOL 88 (1946).
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affect this circuit.5 '
Indeed, neuroscientists have mapped many of the ways in which
addiction affects brain function. Many drugs appear to affect the
neurotransmitter dopamine, which is involved in sensing pleasure and
experiencing subjective feelings of reward.52 Addiction is thus thought to
modify brain function both during acute drug use and after desistance:
"The addicted brain is significantly different from the non-addicted brain
as manifested by changes in brain metabolic activity, receptor availability,
gene expression, and responsiveness to environmental cues."" Like any
other illness, the disease concept adherents argue, addiction changes the
physical functioning of the human body in harmful-but potentially
treatable-ways.
Relatedly, geneticists have recently increased their efforts to explain
addiction as at least partially the result of genetic risk factors. Scientists
generally qualify genetic research about addiction with some version of
the caveat that "many genes contribute to complex traits, interacting with
each other as well as the environments in which they are expressed."54
Nonetheless, human identical twin studies, animal genetic studies, and
other genetic inquiries have suggested the existence of a strong genetic
component to addiction."
As scientific understanding of the neurochemistry and genetics of
addiction have advanced, the claims of disease concept theorists have
become increasingly bold. Richard Bonnie argues, "[A]ddiction
specialists have convincingly demonstrated why addiction is sensibly
understood as a chronic disease similar to other chronic diseases-such as
diabetes and hypertension-that are also characterized by intermittent
remissions and relapses."" The disease concept view maintains that
addiction is largely the result of involuntary processes. O'Brien and
McLellan echo Bonnie in comparing drug addiction to hypertension, adult-
onset diabetes, and asthma: "Like substance-use disorders, the onset of
51. Alan Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease and It Matters, 278 SC. 45, 46 (1997).
52. See generally A. Thomas McLellan, et al., Drug Dependence, a Chronic Mental Illness: Implications
for Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, 284 JAMA 1689, 1691 (2000); Tabitha M. Powledge,
Addiction and the Brain, 49 BIOSCIENCE 513 (1999); Mark A. Schuckit, Science, Medicine and the Future:
Substance Use Disorders, 314 BRrr. MED. J. 1605, 1606 (1997).
53. Leshner, supra note 51, at 46.
54. John C. Crabbe, Genetic Contributions to Addiction, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 435, 452 (2002).
55. While the genetics of addiction are beyond the scope of this paper (and beyond the expertise of the
author), numerous studies have established genetic predictors and risk factors for drug addiction. Many
recent studies are reviewed by Crabbe, supra note 54.
56. Richard J. Bonnie, Addiction and Responsibility, 68 Soc. RESEARCH 813, 814 (2001).
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these three diseases is determined by multiple factors, and the
contributions of each factor are not yet fully specified."" While diabetes
and hypertension are strongly genetically determined, "[p]arenting
practices, stress in the home environment and other environmental factors
are also important in determining whether these diseases actually get
expressed, even among individuals who are genetically predisposed.""
Voluntary behaviors are also important both in addiction and in other
chronic diseases:
[A]lthough a diabetic, hypertensive, or asthmatic patient may
have been genetically predisposed and may have been raised in
a high-risk environment, it is also true that behavioral choices
such as the ingestion of high sugar and/or high-cholesterol
foods, smoking, and lack of exercise also play a part in the onset
and severity of their disorder.59
The disease concept thus characterizes addiction as no different from
other illnesses that result from a combination of genetic, environmental
and behavioral factors.
The analogies to diabetes and hypertension, which recur repeatedly in
the literature on drug dependence, are of great value in applying to the
disease concept to an understanding of how the legal system should deal
with addiction. Perhaps addiction is best understood as a disease whose
contraction and exacerbation can, like those of many diseases, be the result
of individual behavioral choices. As Stephen Morse notes, "A person who
is overweight, does not exercise, and smokes surely is responsible for
risking hypertension.""o Likewise, "[Al person who suffers from many
diseases can ameliorate the consequences by intentionally adhering to a
prescribed medical regimen."" Yet no one would argue that these
illnesses constitute moral failures or are unworthy of treatment. Such
analogies have led many drug specialists to conclude that the disease
concept mitigates the culpability of addicts and entitles them to treatment:
Despite the potential contribution of human agency to the cause
and maintenance of some diseases, no one denies that these are
57. Charles P. O'Brien and A. Thomas McLellan, Myths About the Treatment of Addiction, 347 THE
LANCET 237, 237 (1996).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165,
169 (2006).
61. Id.
28 1
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fundamentally diseases. Moreover, with many and perhaps most
diseases, the sufferer is not responsible for contracting the
disease, and for many diseases there is little or nothing the
sufferer can do to help, other than to seek and cooperate with
professional help and to wait for the disease to run its course.
Although people sometimes can be complicit in their own
diseases, the disease model is so powerful that people who are
ill are not in general considered responsible for the signs,
symptoms, and consequences. The dominant image of people
with diseases is that they are the victims of pathological
mechanisms who deserve sympathy and help and do not deserve
condemnation.62
The disease concept, then, frequently casts addicts more as victims of
their own brain chemistry than as wrongdoers actualizing some depraved
intent.
Of course, the disease concept is not entirely inconsistent with
criminal punishment of addicts. Just as a hypertensive individual would
doubtless still be culpable for stealing salt, an addict who commits
acquisitive property crimes in order to obtain drugs remains subject to the
criminal law. But the issue of prison-based drug treatment presents a
distinct question from the simple culpability of an addict: that is, whether a
drug dependent individual is entitled to treatment for an ailment that, while
potentially contracted recklessly or exacerbated by voluntary behaviors,
poses harm that may be difficult or impossible to prevent without
treatment. Acceptance of the disease concept, then, surely suggests that
prison-based treatment is at least logical, and likely wise.
C. Social Contagion Theory
Another model of addiction, related to the disease concept, is the
notion of social contagion. Social contagion denotes the concept that
emotions and behaviors spread through social networks in predictable
ways." This theory has been applied to various public health issues, most
famously by Nicholas Christakis and James Fowler. Christakis and
Fowler found, for example, that social networks influenced the spread of
obesity "in a quantifiable and discernable pattern that depends on the
nature of social ties."' Even controlling for factors such as common
62. Id.
63. See generally Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion versus Structural
Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1287, 1287 (1987).
64. Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network Over 32
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genetic risk factors and common environmental factors, social ties with
obese people were even more predictive of obesity than geographical or
physical intimacy with obese people." While Christakis and Fowler's
study is limited in its ability to explain the mechanism by which obesity
"spreads" through social networks, changes in norms regarding the
acceptability of being overweight and effects on diet are possible
explanations for how contact with obese people can increase one's own
risk for obesity." Social contagion theory, then, provides a first step in
explaining the epidemiology of diseases with behavioral components.
The social contagion model has been applied to drug and alcohol
consumption in numerous studies. A study of alcohol consumption by
Christakis, Fowler and others found that "[a]lcohol consumption behavior
among persons and those in their social networks is highly correlated.""
The authors contend that while confounding and selection bias cannot be
ruled out, their findings strongly suggest that drinking is induced through
social networks; that is, alcohol consumption is caused by, and not merely
correlated with, social linkages with drinkers." Indeed, this seems
logically consistent with the fact that "drinking cessation programs [such
as Alcoholics Anonymous] that provide peer support-that modify the
social network of the target-are more successful."69 Christakis and
Fowler conducted a similar study of smoking and found that both cigarette
smoking and cessation spread from person to person within social
networks." Moreover, the study found that cessation "cascaded" through
social networks, as "whole connected clusters within the social network
stopped smoking roughly in concert" as a result of collective social
pressure.7 Other researchers have published similar findings.72 Several
studies published around the peak of the American heroin epidemic argued
that "[d]rug use is. . .'contagious', and the routes for spread can be the
same as those for disease, including friendship networks, neighbourhoods
Years, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 370, 377 (2007).
65. Id.
66. Id
67. J. Niels Rosenquist et al., The Spread of Alcohol Consumption Behavior in a Large Social Network,
152 ANN. INT. MED. 426, 430 (2010).
68. Id. at 432.
69. Id
70. Nicholas A. Christakis and James Fowler, The Collective Dynamics of Smoking in a Large Social
Network, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2249, 2256 (2008).
7 1. Id.
72. For a review of many studies regarding the diffusion of drug-related behaviors through social
relationships, see Roberta Ferrence, Diffusion Theory and Drug Use, 96 ADDICTION 165 (2001).
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and institutional settings such as schools, work-places or prisons."73
Initiation of new drug users takes place "through friendship networks of
existing drug users, providing support for key determinants of diffusion,
including compatibility and observability." 74 The use of social contagion
theory to explain both substance abuse and cessation provides a means of
integrating behaviors traditionally conceived of as voluntary, autonomous
actions into a "disease" model of addiction.
D. The Autonomy Model
Of course, the disease concept is not universally accepted, and even
some theorists of addiction who do not dispute certain of its tenets
nonetheless question its relevance to criminal law. Morse, for example,
argues that addiction is essentially just a strong form of desire:
The primary behavioral signs of addiction - seeking and using
substances - are intentional human actions, even if they are also
signs of a disease that has genetic, anatomical, and physiological
causes. Indeed, all intentional action has genetic, anatomical,
and physiological causes, whether or not the action is the sign of
a disease. The addict has an exceptionally powerful desire - a
craving - to consume the addictive substance, believes that
consuming it will satisfy that craving by avoiding pain, causing
pleasure, or some combination of the two, and therefore forms
and acts on the intention to seek and to use the substance. Such
explanatory practical syllogisms are the mark of all intentional
actions."
For Morse, then, the fact that an addict's actions have biological,
genetic or neurochemical underpinnings does not bear on the addict's
culpability. "To assume that the addict is not responsible for addiction-
related behavior just because it has biological causes or because the action
is the sign of a disease generally commits the fundamental psycholegal
error and therefore begs the question of responsibility."" According to this
view, addicts are neither mechanistically coerced from within to behave in
a certain way nor divested of their reasoning capabilities in a manner that
prevents them from responding to rational incentives. "Even if addiction is
73. Id. at 167.
74. Id.
75. Morse, supra note 60, at 176.
76. Id. at 176.
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properly and most usefully characterized as a disease, at the extreme its
necessary behavioral signs are virtually all reward sensitive or reason-
responsive. An addict threatened with instant death for seeking and using
will not seek and use unless she already wishes to die at that moment or
does not care if she does.""
The autonomy perspective thus pushes back against the disease
concept insofar as it questions whether a condition that can be eliminated
by voluntary desistance can truly constitute an illness. Jeffrey Schaler
notes that "[h]eavy, habitual users of drugs, including alcohol, often
moderate or cease taking the drug without help from anyone else.""
Schaler points out that a genetic predisposition to certain behavior does not
automatically constitute a disease.79 He also disputes the analogies
advanced by disease concept adherents between addiction and chronic
diseases like diabetes, noting that the "symptoms" of addiction
(compulsive drug use) are coterminous with the definition of the disease
itself. Whereas diabetes can be present (according to objective medical
definitions of the condition) for some time without causing noticeable
symptoms, "there is no such thing as asymptomatic addiction, and
logically there could not be." 0 In short, for critics of the disease concept:
A person starts, moderates or abstains from drinking because
that person wants to. People do the same thing with heroin,
cocaine, and tobacco. Such choices reflect the person's values.
The person, a moral agent, chooses to use drugs or refrains from
using drugs because he or she finds meaning in doing so."
Schaler, then, rejects altogether the notion that drugs constrain the
free will of addicts.
Some critics of the disease concept criticize what they see as its
overly deterministic view of behavior while still conceding that addiction
can alter brain function and change individuals' responses to various
stimuli and incentives. For instance, a weaker form of the autonomy view
maintains that although addiction clearly compromises an addict's
volition, addicts are still culpable for actions they take while under the
influence or pursuing the acquisition of drugs, because the initial decision
77. Id. at 168-9.
78. JEFFREY A. SCHALER, ADDICTION IS A CHOICE 8 (2000).
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id at 17. Schaler does not address the philosophy of 12-step programs, whose participants frequently
refer to themselves as "recovering" addicts (i.e. presumably, at least in some cases, asymptomatic addicts).
81. Id. at 20.
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to use was freely undertaken. As Morse notes, "[p]eople can, of course, be
responsible for initially contracting or risking contracting diseases."82
According to this perspective, "[w]hen the addictfirstusesaddictive illegal
drugs, it should be reasonably foreseeable to him that he could become
drug dependent and consequently desire to possess and use illegal drugs in
the future;" an addict should also be able to predict "that he might be
tempted to engage in future illegal conduct in order to facilitate his
continued drug use."83 Under this view, the traditional criminal law
concepts of justification and excuse do not undermine the culpability of
drug addicts because those defenses are generally unavailable to
defendants who knowingly place themselves in a position from which they
are likely to violate the law. "Actual or constructive foreseeability is
generally required for culpability, and thus the addict would not be
justified, nor properly excused, for that matter, for his later drug use or for
the crimes he committed to facilitate his habit."84 Of course, this view
does not consider the obviously imperfect information possessed by any
potential addict at the instance of first use. Education about the potential
addictiveness and other harms of various substances is not equally
available to everyone, and most people can only guess their own
susceptibility to addiction based on a sketchy understanding of family
history or any number of other potential contributing factors to addiction,
which are poorly understood even by scientists who study the issue."
Importantly, the autonomy perspective generally does not dispute that
volition is compromised once addiction has taken hold. Moreover, only
the most extreme proponents of this view dispute the empirical evidence
that addiction treatment can be effective in reducing compulsive drug use,
whether such use is ultimately the result of a brain disease or simply a
strongly felt desire. The dispute among commentators, then, is most
salient on the issue of whether the effects of drug addiction are sufficient
to mitigate criminal culpability, and not whether drug addiction
profoundly affects the behavior of addicts. Indeed, as discussed below,
this debate is mirrored in the opinions of federal judges over the period
since drug addiction became a fact of life in the United States.
Certainly, the extent of drug addicts' culpability for acts that result in
incarceration is an important question, and one that arguably bears directly
82. Morse, supra note 60, at 169.
83. Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought
To Be, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 725, 870 (2004).
84. Id.
85. See generally DAVID A. PETERS, THE PROBABILITY OF ADDICTION: LEGAL, MEDICAL AND SOCIAL
IPLICATIONS 33-54 (1997).
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upon the extent of services that prisoners deserve once behind bars. Yet,
as the Supreme Court has held, imprisonment itself-albeit often under
harsh conditions-is "the penalty that that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society."" Inhumane or degrading confinement
conditions that do not serve legitimate penological interests cannot be
justified on the basis that they are simply part of repaying a prisoner's debt
to the community. Thus, even if addicts are legally responsible for their
criminal acts, the question of what is constitutionally protected once
imprisoned is a distinct matter." For the purposes of this paper, the
important question then is not whether addicts possess free will, but
whether they suffer from a harmful ailment that can and should be
treated-and whether American prisoners are entitled to such treatment as
a matter of law. As such, I turn next to the treatment of drug dependence
in American law.
III. ADDICTION AS A TREATABLE DISEASE IN FEDERAL LAW
This section analyzes the treatment of both alcoholism and drug
addiction in federal case law over the past century. First, I trace the
adoption of a strong-form disease concept theory in several early cases.
Next, I argue that courts have subsequently pulled back somewhat from
the disease concept in decisions regarding criminal culpability, favoring a
more autonomy-oriented view in cases involving insanity defenses.
Finally, I note that upholding the criminal culpability of addicts does not
inherently conflict with an understanding of addiction as a medical
problem worthy of treatment.
86. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
87. This is not to suggest that the relationship between harm and punishment is irrelevant. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines suggest that up to six months in prison is an appropriate sentence for a defendant
convicted of drug possession as a first offense; the guideline is progressively more severe for defendants
with significant criminal histories, and defendants who possess opiates or crack cocaine start off at an
"offense level" four steps higher than a defendant convicted for possessing cannabis or other or other
putatively less harmful substances. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2D2.1 cmt. n.l (2010), U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES Sentencing Table. In its findings and declarations regarding the Drug Abuse and
Control Act, Congress noted that "possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial
and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the American people." 21 U.S.C. 801(2) (2006).
This suggests that federal possession laws are intended to punish an individual's decision to risk his or her
own health, and that punishments are more severe for more harmful drugs because the health risks are
greater. Failure to provide access to prison-based drug treatment is thus particularly illogical in the case of
addicts who are in prison merely for possession of illegal drugs, since the stated justification for sanctioning
possession is a concern for public health.
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A. The Disease Concept in Federal Constitutional Jurisprudence
Federal court jurisprudence was no exception to the trend toward a
disease concept of addiction in twentieth century America. Some of the
Supreme Court's earliest decisions taking up the nature of addiction
declared it unequivocally to be a disease. In Linder v. United States, the
Court famously declared that addicts "are diseased and proper subjects for
medical treatment."" Other decisions from the first years of the nation's
struggle with addiction confirm this approval of the disease concept,
frequently distinguishing between drug dealers and addict-consumers (the
latter often being viewed as the hapless victims of the former). A federal
judge in California during the Great Depression wrote with approval of the
Harrison Act,8 praising its innovation in drawing "the line between the
addict who may be found with illegally obtained drugs in his possession
and the peddler who, for a consideration, supplies the need and barters
upon what has been here declared to be a disease."90 As drug dependence
spread from poor and immigrant communities to all strata of society, the
legal system was quick to embrace a view of addiction that characterized
addicts as victims of an illness while castigating drug suppliers as
cynically profiting from an insidious disease.
Perhaps the most well-known and important treatment of addiction
by an American court came in Robinson v. Cahfornia." In Robinson, the
Supreme Court unequivocally declared drug addiction to be a disease and
declared unconstitutional a California law that criminalized the mere
"status" of being an addict even in the absence of any requirement of actus
reus (e.g. proof of drug possession or use).92 Speaking for the majority,
Justice Stewart wrote that "in the light of contemporary human knowledge,
a law which made a criminal offense of. . .a disease would doubtless be
universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."9 3 The Court
unflinchingly applied this reasoning to the California statute at bar, noting
88. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (holding that a physician could not be criminally liable
when he dispensed morphine or cocaine as treatment for an addiction).
89. Passed in 1914, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act was among the first pieces of federal legislation to
regulate the distribution of opiates. For an excellent review of the history of the Act's passage, see
generally MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 32 at 54-68.
90. United States v. Anthony, 15 F. Supp. 553, 555 (S.D. Cal. 1936) (stating "[a]And in dealing out
punishment I think the courts, as a rule, have distinguished between the two conditions, treating one as a
diseased and unfortunate person and the other as a mercenary trafficker in drugs.")
91. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
92. Id. at 665-66.
93. Id. at 666.
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that "counsel for the State recognized that narcotic addiction is an illness.
Indeed, it is apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or
involuntarily." 94 In addition to describing addiction as a disease, the
justices suggested that this designation was a matter of widespread
consensus95 and even appeared to embrace a form of the social contagion
model.96 The Supreme Court in Robinson thus built upon the foundation
provided by Linder, seeming to set the stage for American courts'
wholesale adoption of the disease concept.
Yet the Supreme Court seemed to pull back from the disease concept,
or at least qualify its adoption of a disease model, in the case of Powell v.
Texas.97 Decided just six years after Robinson, Powell involved a criminal
defendant named Leroy Powell who challenged his conviction for
violating a public drunkenness law. Powell argued that as an addict, his
appearance in public while drunk was essentially involuntary.9 ' In a 5-to-4
decision, the Court declined to extend Robinson to Powell's case,
distinguishing the "status" of addiction from the act punished by the Texas
law: "The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only
if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior,
which society has an interest in preventing."9 Importantly, the justices did
not completely jettison the disease concept. Nevertheless, the opinion
clearly questions the wisdom of premising a judicial holding on a theory
that was subject to widespread contention even within the clinical and
medical communities:
[T]he inescapable fact is that there is no agreement among
members of the medical profession about what it means to say
that "alcoholism" is a "disease." One of the principal works in
this field states that the major difficulty in articulating a "disease
concept of alcoholism" is that "alcoholism has too many
94. Idat 667.
95. "'Of course it is generally conceded that a narcotic addict, particularly one addicted to the use of
heroin, is in a state of mental and physical illness."' Id. at 667, n8 (quoting Brief for Appellee).
96. "Drug addiction is more prevalent in this country than in any other nation of the western world.... It is
sometimes referred to as 'a contagious disease."' Id. at 669 (internal citations omitted).
97. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
98. Id. at 518. Following Robinson, At least two U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals had accepted a version of
this argument based upon a strong form of the disease concept. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th
Cir. 1966); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
99. Powell, 392 U.S. at 533. Interestingly, the Court's opinion seems at least partially based on the
"voluntary desistance" argument articulated by Schaler and others. Leroy Powell's admission at trial that
he had voluntarily limited his drinking on the day of his trial in order to be able to give testimony in his
defense was taken at least implicitly as evidence that his earlier public drunkenness was the result of a
voluntary act. Id. at 519-20.
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definitions and disease has practically none." This same author
[Jellinek] concludes that "a disease is what the medical
profession recognizes as such." In other words, there is
widespread agreement today that "alcoholism" is a "disease,"
for the simple reason that the medical profession has concluded
that it should attempt to treat those who have drinking problems.
There the agreement stops. 100
Thus, while conceding that experts had reached a consensus that
addiction is a disease, the Court highlighted the difficulty of extrapolating
from that consensus a coherent legal theory of addiction given the
ambiguity of the term "disease" itself."' Crucially, however, the one
premise of the disease concept that the majority accepted was the
desirability of treatment for addiction. While the disease concept had been
questioned as a mitigating factor for culpability,102 its corollary that addicts
need help had not truly been undermined.
B. The Disease Concept, Culpability, and the Insanity Defense:
What Role for Treatment?
In the wake of Robinson and Powell, the disease concept of addiction
was firmly established in federal common law but was of questionable
relevance in determining a defendant's liability for a criminal act. As
such, a significant amount of federal litigation followed seeking to
determine the limits of the disease concept as an exculpatory factor. One
of the first federal appeals courts to take up this question was Brown v.
United States.o3 In Brown, the D.C. Circuit accepted the notion that the
defendant, an addict, suffered from an illness and thus reversed and
remanded his case to allow him to develop an insanity defense."
Similarly, another D.C. Circuit case that year, Castle v. United States, held
that testimony relating to narcotic addiction provided a basis from which
the jury, under proper instructions, could have found (but was not required
to find) a causal relationship between the defendant's drug-related
100. Id. at 522 (internal citations omitted).
101. For a contemporaneous review of the Powell decision questioning the "disease concept," particularly
as applied by the Powell dissenters, see generally Herbert Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of a
Factual Foundation for the "Disease Concept ofAlcoholism," 83 HARv. L. REv. 793 (1970).
102. For instance, in United States v. Moore, the D.C. Circuit characterized the dynamic between Robinson
and Powell as at once forbidding punishment of an individual for experiencing cravings but allowing
punishment for acting upon them, including by illegally procuring prohibited drugs. "There is no Eighth
Amendment defense for the addict-possessor." 486 F.2d 1139, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
103. Brown v. United States, 331 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
104. Id. at 823.
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"abnormality" and the charged offenses of purchasing drugs without a tax
stamp and facilitating the concealment and sale of drugs with knowledge
that they were illegally imported."'
Other courts were less accepting of addiction as a per se criminal
defense. The Fifth Circuit, for instance, held in Bailey v. United States
that conviction of an addict did not present an Eighth Amendment
problem:
[T]he record contains no evidence probative of the contention
that addiction eliminates the criminal intent of a narcotics
offender. It would appear that an element of reasoned choice yet
exists when an addict knowingly violates the law in acquiring
and using drugs. One is not excused for offending
simplybecause he wanted to very, very badly. 10
The autonomy view, equating addiction to any other strong desire,
was thus alive and well even after Robinson. The Second Circuit, while
observing that severe mental deterioration from years of drug use could
constitute a "mental disease" for the purposes of the insanity defense, held
that "[m]ere recidivism or narcotics addiction will not of themselves justify
acquittal.""0 ' The split in the courts thus mirrored debates that continue
today between strong-form disease concept adherents and autonomy-
oriented scholars like Morse: does drug dependence truly overcome
individual volition?
After Powell, the answer to this question seemed increasingly to be
"no," at least for the purposes of courts applying the doctrines of mens rea.
This proposition was perhaps most starkly stated by the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Lyons.'" The Lyons court overruled a previous Fifth
Circuit decision, United States v. Bass, 109to the extent that the Bass
decision could be read to hold that mere drug addiction, "voluntary or
involuntary, [could] be a mental disease for legal purposes."' 10
Importantly, however, the Lyons court, like the Supreme Court in Powell,
did not completely repudiate the disease concept. The Lyons court held
that with regard to questions of culpability, the courts are "not necessarily
served by an uncritical application of definitions developed with medical
105. Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
106. Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1967).
107. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d. Cir. 1965).
108. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984).
109. United States v. Bass, 90 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1976).
110. Lyons, 731 F.2d at 246.
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considerations of diagnosis and treatment foremost in mind."".' But the
opinion concedes that as to the classification of addiction as a disease
because of the effect drugs have on the brain, "the medical model must
have its day."" 2  Moreover, the decision embraces treatment as an
appropriate and desirable response to addiction. In fact, one of the
opinion's justifications for punishing an addict who chooses to use drugs
was that "he could instead have participated in an addiction treatment
program."" 3  Much like Powell, Lyons and similar decisions have
questioned the utility of the disease concept as applied to the narrow issue
of criminal responsibility for addicts,"4 but have accepted the framework
of addiction as a medical issue worthy of, and indeed requiring, treatment.
Contemporary federal statutory and administrative law reveals a
general acceptance of the disease concept as appropriately characterizing
the status of addicts, if not excusing them from criminal responsibility.
Congress and federal agencies routinely treat drug and alcohol dependence
as diseases. The Americans with Disabilities Act expressly classifies
alcoholism as a protected disability, holding employers who do not make
reasonable accommodations for alcoholic workers civilly liable."'
Importantly, the law is animated by an acceptance of the wisdom and
desirability of treatment for addiction; for example, firing an employee
who takes time off to enter rehabilitation for alcoholism is considered a
paradigmatic violation of the ADA."' And while the ADA does not
explicitly protect the use of illegal drugs, it does apply to individuals who
have successfully undergone treatment or who are currently participating
in rehabilitation."' In fact, the ADA terms drug addiction a "physical or
mental impairment" entitled to antidiscrimination protection."' "This
111. Id
112. Id at 247.
113. Id at 245.
114. For an interesting application of these principles to a non-substance addiction, see United States v.
Tomiero, 735 F.2d 725 (2d. Cir. 1984) (holding that trial judge did not err in excluding as irrelevant
evidence that defendant was a compulsive gambler despite conflicting testimony by psychiatrists as to
whether gambling addiction constituted a "mental disease or defect" for the purposes of the insanity
defense).
115. 42 U.S.C. 12114(a).
116. Joyce Krutick Barlow, Alcoholism as a Disability under the Social Security Act - An Analysis of the
History, and Proposals for Change, 18 J. NAT'L ASS'N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 273, 281 (1998); see also
Corbett v. National Products Company, No. 94-2652, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3949 (E.D. Pa., 1995).
117. 42 U.S.C. 12114(b).
118. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(ii) (2006) ("The phrase physical
or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, such contagious and noncontagious diseases and
conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular
dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific
learning disabilities, HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction,
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congressional recognition of drug addiction as a disability demonstrates
that drug addiction is to be treated as a medical problem, even if public
policy remains somewhat schizophrenically committed to punitive
prohibition."' 19
Likewise, the Social Security Administration accepted, at least
temporarily, the disease model. "From 1972 until 1994, addicts could, with
certain qualifications, receive benefits under Social Security Disability
Insurance ("SSDI") or its sister program, Supplemental Security Income
(SSI)."l20 Even proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504, which would
have set forth the parameters of the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
implicitly adhered to the disease concept. The rule, though not enacted,121
would have protected communications between patients and those
"engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition,
including drug addiction."l 2 2  Again, proposed Rule 504 represents an
implicit understanding on the part of Congress that addiction is an ailment
for which treatment is appropriate.
Federal case law has thus largely embraced the disease concept of
addiction, while evincing a clear reticence to extend that theory directly to
the question of criminal responsibility. Statutory and administrative law
have mostly followed suit in recent years. In this context, I turn next to the
significance of the law's adoption of the disease concept to contemporary
Eighth Amendment doctrine, arguing that the disease model may lend
support to the notion of constitutionally mandated drug treatment in
prisons.
IV. PRISON-BASED TREATMENT AND THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
This section will trace the trajectory of federal jurisprudence
concerning the Constitution's prohibition on the infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishments."l 23 I begin by analyzing how the federal courts have
applied the Eighth Amendment to the provision of medical care in prisons,
and alcoholism.").
119. Andrew Brunsden, Hepatitis C in Prisons: Evolving Toward Decency Through Adequate Medical
Care and Public Health Reform, 54 UCLA L. REv. 465, 477 (2006).
120. Dru Stevenson, Should Addicts Get Welfare? Addiction & SSISSDI, 68 BROOKLYN L. REv. 185, 185
(2002).
121. Congress opted to allow the courts to develop testimonial privileges through their common-
lawmaking authority instead of codifying them legislatively. Thus, its decision not to adopt the rule was
unrelated to any judgment about the accuracy of the disease model of addiction.
122. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 504 (not enacted).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VIH.
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highlighting the potential applicability of Eighth Amendment doctrine to
the context of prison-based drug treatment. I then construct a brief case
study, using several federal cases regarding methadone maintenance
treatment (MMT) in correctional settings. I argue that the protections
afforded to inmates against "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs" should extend to the context of drug treatment programs.
A. The Development of the Deliberate Indifference Standard
In Estelle v. Gamble,'24 the United States Supreme Court held that
inadequate medical care for prisoners could implicate the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In order to state a
claim against corrections officials, inmate-plaintiffs must show both that
their medical needs are severe and that prison staff were intentionally
heedless:
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the
indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to
the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering
with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how
evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness
or injury states a cause of action under § 1983."25
For a prisoner to claim successfully that prison-based drug treatment
is constitutionally mandated, she would have to make a two-part showing.
First, she would be required to show that she have been deprived of a basic
human need. Food, clothing, shelter, exercise, reasonable safety, and-
most importantly here-medical care, have all been found to be clear
examples of basic human needs.'26 Demonstrating the deprivation of a
basic human need is sometimes referred to as the "objective element" of
the Eighth Amendment standard. The "subjective element," which is often
considerably more difficult to prove in court, requires that one or more
defendants acted with a culpable state of mind-deliberate indifference-
toward the plaintiff.'27 In other words, "[p]rison officials are deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or
124. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
125. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-5.
126. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).
127. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991).
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intentionally interfere with medical treatment."l 28
Of course, both the word "serious" and the phrase "deliberate
indifference" are ambiguous, and the courts have generally applied them
narrowly and with a reluctance to expand liability for discretionary acts by
prison officials. 129  Nonetheless, the development of case law since the
Estelle decision could provide a constitutional basis for claims to prison-
based drug treatment by prisoners suffering from addiction. A close
examination of the "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"
standard shows that there is no legally principled distinction between drug
treatment and other forms of medical care that are constitutionally
mandated in prison settings, given the extensive support in case law for a
disease conception of addiction.
B. "Serious"
Ailments that constitute a "serious" harm to a free person may not
always be "serious" in the eyes of the law when that same affliction befalls
a prisoner. The Supreme Court has held that when "conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society.""o However, no court has
gone so far as to hold that prisoners can legally be made to suffer from
treatable medical or mental health disorders as part of their sentence.
Courts have diverged on the difficult issue of defining seriousness.
In the Second Circuit, for example, courts consider several factors,
including "whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the
medical need in question as important and worthy of comment or
treatment... [and] whether the medical condition significantly affects daily
activities.""' In the Ninth Circuit, by contrast, "[a] serious medical need is
present whenever the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in
128. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. This paper does not address issues of qualified immunity, which generally shields government
officials in a discretionary capacity from liability if their actions, even if subsequently found unlawful, did
not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Although some courts have recognized
prisoners' right to continuation of certain drug dependence treatments (see methadone discussion, infra Part
E), it is unlikely that any court in the status quo would hold an official liable for damages for failure to
provide drug treatment, given the paucity of legal precedents supporting drug treatment as a constitutional
right. However, equitable relief-such as an injunction or declaratory judgment-would likely be an
appropriate remedy for an inmate who successfully alleged that the inaccessibility of prison-based drug
treatment violated her constitutional rights.
130. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
131. Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain."l32 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, meanwhile, has held
that "[a] serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a
layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.""
In determining seriousness, then, it might be said that courts
generally look to both the professional judgment of the medical
community and to the potential that a given condition, if left untreated,
will cause further harm. The scientific and medical communities largely
agree that addiction is rightly considered and treated as a disease.'34 The
World Health Organization"' and the American Medical Association"'
consider addiction to be a treatable illness. Likewise, it is clear that when
untreated, addiction can be expected to cause future harm. According to
the National Institutes of Health, untreated drug addiction can lead to
increased mortality, unemployment, criminal activity, and increased
exposure to health risks like hepatitis and AIDS, among other health
harms."'
C. "Medical"
As we have seen, the federal courts have widely accepted the notion
that addiction is a medical disease. Thus, the notion that prison-based
treatment should address a medical issue should be uncontroversial.
Nonetheless, some commentators have argued that as far as the law is
concerned, drug addiction should be treated no differently than other
cravings or desires (including a greedy person's craving for money)."'
However, the federal courts have unanimously concluded that, as in
132. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
133. Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997).
134. Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Expanding Drug Treatment in
Communities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 631, 638-39 (2005) ("Twenty years of scientific research...has
convinced the majority of the biomedical community - if not the public generally - that addiction is a brain
disease: a condition caused by persistent changes in brain structure and function.").
135. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME & WORLD HEALTH ORG., PRINCIPLES OF DRUG
DEPENDENCE TREATMENT 1 (2008), available at
http://www.who.int/substance abuse/publications/principlesdrug dependence treatment.pdf ("Drug
dependence is considered a multi-factorial health disorder that often follows the course of a relapsing and
remitting chronic disease.").
136. See, e.g., AM. MED. AssoC., ACCESS TO AND PAYMENT FOR TREATMENT SERVICES, available at
http.//www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/alcohol/access.pdf (AMA policies treat alcoholism and substance
abuse disorders as diseases);
137. Nat'l Institutes of Health, Nat'1 Consensus Dev. Panel on Effective Med. Treatment of Opiate
Addiction, Effective Medical Treatment of Opiate Addiction, 280 JAMA 1936, 1938-39 (1998).
138. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
777, 813-14 (1985).
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the words of the Fifth Circuit, "mental health needs are no less serious
than physical needs."'39 Even a condition that is wholly neurological or
even psychological can constitute a "serious medical need" for the
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.'40 Many courts have utilized a test
similar to the one articulated in Tillery v. Owens, which held that the
Eighth Amendment covers mental ailments that cause "significant
disruption in an inmate's everyday life and which prevents his functioning
in the general population without disturbing or endangering others or
himself." 4 ' No definition of drug addiction would fail to satisfy this test.
Moreover, courts have shown a willingness to look outside
"traditional" models of illness in defining medical needs. For instance, a
transsexual woman forced to terminate her hormone treatments upon
entering a sex-segregated male prison -and to go through painful breast
reduction and other physical repercussions as a result-was found to have
suffered from deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.'42 Clearly,
then, public acceptance of a treatment or of the morality of the individuals
who need it is not a prerequisite for a deliberate indifference claim.'43
Likewise, numerous courts have held that failure to protect inmates from
their own self-harming tendencies constitutes deliberate indifference. The
most common context for such decisions has been when prison officials
fail to follow up or provide treatment when an inmate displays credible
risk factors for suicide.'" The same logic has also been extended to cases
139. Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers
of City of Houston, Texas, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986)). See also Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d
231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991) ("deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious mental health needs violates the
eighth amendment"); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[t]reatment of the mental
disorders of mentally disturbed inmates is a serious medical need") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44,47 (4th Cir. 1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821
F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir.1987)) (observing that .'[c]ourts have repeatedly held that treatment of a psychiatric
or psychological condition may present a serious medical need'); Langley v. Coughlin, 888 F.2d 252, 254
(2d. Cir. 1989) ("We think it plain that from the legal standpoint psychiatric
or mental health care is an integral part of medical care. It thus falls within the requirement of Estelle v.
Gamble, [429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)], that it must be provided to prisoners.")
141. 719 F. Supp. 1256, 1286 (W.D. Pa. 1989), affd, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990).
142. Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affd 932 F.2d 969 (6th
Cir. 1991).
143. See also Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding gender dysphoria to give rise
to a serious medical need).
144. See, e.g., Conn. v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2010) (failure of officers to recognize
legitimate threats of suicide); Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs, 368 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004) (failure to
respond to signs that prisoner was suicidal); Olsen v. Bloomberg, 339 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2003) (failure to
take reasonable steps to prevent prisoner suicide); Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir.
2003) (failure to respond to warnings that prisoner was suicidal); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6th
Cir. 2001) (failure to respond to warnings that prisoner was suicidal); Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
297
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 14.2:271
where a prison failed to treat an inmate's compulsion to self-mutilate. 145
Like addiction, suicidal ideation and self-mutilation might be seen as in
some sense "chosen" behaviors on the part of the sufferer. That some in
the public view addiction as an existential weakness provides no legally
principled support for the notion that it is less "serious" or less "medical"
than other afflictions whose treatments courts have deemed to be
constitutionally mandated. 146
In addition to recognizing medical needs that are wholly
neuropsychological, courts have also recognized that illnesses with
behavioral components are "medical" conditions. In Hunt v. Uphoff, for
example, the Tenth Circuit held that an inmate had properly stated a
deliberate indifference claim by alleging that medical complications he
had suffered were caused by inadequate treatment in prison for diabetes
and hypertension.147 Likewise, the court in Taylor v. Anderson rejected the
argument that because adult-onset diabetes differs from person to person,
failure to provide a special diet did not constitute deliberate indifference.148
If this argument fails in the context of diabetes, it must also fail in the
context of addiction: the lack of any failsafe method to medically treat
addiction effectively in all individuals does not relieve prison officials of
their duty to make a good-faith effort at providing treatment. Moreover, as
noted above, drug dependence is frequently analogized to diseases like
diabetes and hypertension-both by disease concept adherents and some
autonomy-oriented critics-because these diseases are the result of a
combination of behavioral, genetic, and environmental factors.149  "Drug
addiction is similar to other chronic illnesses such as diabetes, heart
disease, and lung cancer in that voluntary, yet socially conditioned,
behaviors, such as diet or smoking, can lead to the onset and development
724, 738 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1989) (failure to
respond to warnings that prisoner was suicidal); see also Mombourquette v. Amundson, 469 F. Supp. 2d
624, 655 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (deliberate indifference to risk that plaintiff would attempt suicide); Arnold v.
Lewis, 803 F. Supp. 246, 257-58 (D. Ariz. 1992) (failure to respond to warnings that prisoner was suicidal).
145. De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003).
146. In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court provided further support for the notion that the Eighth
Amendment covers ailments that are entirely internal to the sufferer's brain. The Court in Farmer
recognized transsexualism as a "rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable
about his or her anatomical sex, and... typically seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and
surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change." 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994). Despite being internal to an
individual's brain, in other words, transsexualism might indeed give rise to "serious medical needs,"
attention to which would constitutionally mandated by the Eighth Amendment.
147. 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
148. 868 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
149. See, e.g., J. Thomas Payte, The Use of Insulin in the Treatment of Diabetes: An Analogy to
Methadone Maintenance, 2 J. MAINTENANCE ADDICTIONS 95 (2003).
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of the disease.""'o As such, if diabetes and hypertension are cognizable
under the Eighth Amendment because they may give rise to future harm,
surely addiction fits the mold of a serious medical condition requiring
treatment.
Finally, drug dependence is indistinguishable from constitutionally
recognized "medical" needs in terms of treatability. The American
Medical Association has adopted an authoritative resolution "endors[ing]
the proposition that drug dependencies, including alcoholism, are diseases
and that their treatment is a legitimate part of medical practice."' 5 ' It is
beyond dispute that this represents the consensus of the mainstream
medical community. Moreover, notwithstanding the widespread belief
that drug addicts cannot be reformed, drug treatment can be quite effective
when a treatment modality is chosen that is appropriate to the
circumstances and is administered properly. Alan Leshner suggests that
"[d]rug treatment reduces drug use by 40% to 60% and significantly
decreases criminal activity during and after treatment."l 52 Drug treatment,
importantly, has been empirically proven to be "as successful as treatment
of other chronic illnesses."' Drug addiction is thus no less "medical" in
nature than other ailments recognized in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
D. "Needs"
Perhaps the most intuitive understanding of a "need" is the most
restrictive one: something without which a person cannot survive.
Fortunately, however, numerous court decisions have clarified that a
prisoner's medical condition need not be life-threatening to state a
deliberate indifference claim. The Second Circuit, for instance, has
defined a "serious medical need" as present whenever "the failure to treat
a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."'54 Medical conditions that are
150. Brunsden, supra note 119, at 476; see also Brian R. Edlin et al., Overcoming Barriers to Prevention,
Care, and Treatment ofHepatitis C in Illicit Drug Users, 40 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S276 (2005)
(noting the medical consensus that "[d]rug use is a complex behavior with multidimensional determinants,
including social, psychological, cultural, economic, and biological factors").
151. AM. MED. Ass'N, DEFINITIONS, H-95.983 Drug Dependencies as Diseases (Nov. 24, 2003), available
at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/388/alcoholism-treatable.pdf
152. Alan I. Leshner, Science-Based Views ofDrug Addiction and Its Treatment, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
1314, 1316 (1999).
153. Id.
154. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698,
702 (2d Cir. 1998)). Meanwhile, some courts have held that "a medical need is sufficiently serious 'if it is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
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not life-threatening can nevertheless constitute "serious medical needs" for
constitutional purposes. This generally occurs if the conditions result in
pain or loss of function. Examples have included severe heartburn with
frequent vomiting,'"' painful keloid scars,'56 contact with errant pepper-
spray directed at another inmate,' a swollen and painful knee,' the
denial of medication prescribed for a seizure disorder,'59 post-surgical care
for an inmate's hand,' back pain, 16' a lacerated lip,162 hemorrhoids, 163 and
boils.'"
Indeed, federal courts have expressly held that the Estelle test covers
even ailments that present a risk of causing future harm. The Supreme
Court aptly noted that "[i]t would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates
who plainly proved an unsafe. . .condition in their prison on the ground
that nothing yet had happened to them."'6 It was on this basis that the
court in Harrison v. Barkley held that an untreated dental cavity could
constitute a serious medical need: "a tooth cavity is a degenerative
condition, and if it is left untreated indefinitely, it is likely to produce
agony and to require more invasive and painful treatments. . .66 The
consequences of untreated addiction are at least as serious. Like a cavity,
addiction may be seen as a "degenerative" ailment. While no treatment is
certain to work, left untreated addiction is essentially guaranteed to
snowball into various second-order harms. Treatment has the potential to
decrease drug use, recidivism, and health problems resulting from drug
dependence.'
Drug addiction, then, is logically indistinguishable from other
ailments already covered under the "deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs" test. The Eighth Amendment has to date been held to
require prisons to treat illnesses defined exclusively by reference to the
sufferer's brain functionality; diseases to which the sufferer has
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention."' Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364,
1373 (10th Cir. 1997).
155. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
156. Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 163- (2d Cir. 2003).
157. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2002).
158. Ellis v. Butler, 890 F.2d 1001, 1003 (8th Cir. 1989).
159. Pulliam v. Shelby County, 902 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).
160. Chaney v. City of Chicago, 901 F. Supp. 266, 270 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
161. Bouchard v. Magnusson, 715 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D. Me. 1989).
162. Smallwood v. Renfro, 708 F. Supp. 182, 187 (N.D. 111. 1989).
163. Henderson v. Harris, 672 F. Supp. 1054, 1059 (N.D. 111. 1987).
164. Case v. Bixler, 518 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
165. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).
166. 219 F.3d 132, 137 (2d. Cir. 2000).
167. See generally Grangetto, supra note 18, at 390-3.
300
2012]PROPER SUBJECTS FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT?
contributed through voluntary behavior; ailments considered by
mainstream society to be unworthy of treatment; diseases for which
treatment is not guaranteed to succeed due to the variety of symptom
permutations seen across various individual sufferers; and diseases which
present relatively little cause for medical concern in the present but
threaten to degenerate and cause severe future harms. Indeed, as we shall
see, courts have already begun recognizing the need for drug treatment in
prisons under the existing case law. In what follows, I argue that the
constitutional mandate for prison-based treatment should be explicitly
recognized and expanded.
E. The Methadone Cases: A Case Study of "Serious Medical Need"
In this section, I highlight the jurisprudence surrounding methadone
maintenance and the Eighth Amendment. Methadone maintenance, or
MMT, is the modality of corrections-based drug treatment that has most
explicitly prompted courts to address Eighth Amendment issues
surrounding drug addiction in prison and jails. Much of the litigation
around methadone maintenance in correctional settings has been initiated
by pre-trial detainees who were denied methadone in jail while awaiting
trial. Because pre-trial detention is viewed as a means of preventing flight
from criminal charges and not as punishment per se, these cases have
tended to be decided under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than under the Eighth Amendment.168 Before 1979,
courts applied a due process balancing test to determine whether a given
practice toward pre-trial detainees was justified by a sufficient state
interest. Under this test, the Third Circuit determined that the denial of
methadone to a detained MMT patient violated the constitutional
guarantee of due process "unless the state can demonstrate that a
legitimate security concern, or a genuine fear of substantial administrative
disruption, warrants this interference with plaintiffs medical care."l69 The
court further held that "the record [did] not demonstrate a connection
between the security interest justifying the incarceration of a pretrial
detainee and the deprivation of liberty complained of' by a patient whose
methadone had been terminated.' Importantly, the court both recognized
that a heroin addict had a cognizable medical need for methadone and
168. Cf Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d. Cir. 1976) (holding that "[ilt would
be anomalous to afford a pretrial detainee less constitutional protection than one who has been convicted");
Id at 1079-80.
169. Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1185 (3d. Cir. 1978).
170. Id
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found that legitimate penological objectives did not justify termination.
However, the federal courts changed course after the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Bell v. Wolfish."' In Bell, the justices held that
pretrial detainees must show that their treatment was punitive in order to
state a due process claim.172 Although Bell was not itself a methadone
case, it influenced subsequent methadone-related decisions because it
seemed to narrow the grounds on which an addict could successfully sue
corrections officials. As such, the Third Circuit retreated from its holding
in Norris when it decided Inmates of Allegheny Jail v. Pierce.17 1 In
Allegheny Jail, the court found that maintaining a drug-free prison
environment was a sufficient rationale for withholding methadone.174 The
Fourth Circuit followed suit in Fredericks v. Huggins, declining to find
that detainees had a right to methadone treatment or even to comfortable
detoxification. 7 5
Not all of the existing case law is so unfavorable to methadone
treatment in correctional settings, however. In Cudnik v. Kreiger, the
Sixth Circuit held that denying methadone to detainees who had been
prescribed the treatment before their incarceration violated their
constitutional rights.'7 ' The Cudnik opinion correctly repudiates the logic
of the Allegheny Jail court, which justified a methadone ban for the
purpose of ensuring a contraband-free jail. The court concluded that
methadone patients could be isolated from the rest of the inmate
population to minimize disruptions and that the possibility that a black
market for methadone would spontaneously generate in the jail was "at
best highly remote.""' Methadone could be (and indeed was) stored
outside the facility and administered only in the presence of medical
personnel.77 The court declined to take the logical next step and hold that
banning methadone from a facility to maintain a drug-free environment is
nonsensical because methadone is not actually a drug of abuse.' 7 1
171. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
172. Id. at 560-61.
173. 612 F.2d 754 (3d. Cir. 1979).
174. Id. at 761.
175. 711 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1983).
176. 392 F. Supp. 305, 312-3 (6th Cir. 1974).
177. Id. at 312.
178. Id
179. The overwhelming consensus of experts is that methadone is not properly viewed as a recreational
drug and does not produce a high as traditionally associated with drugs of abuse. Vincent P. Dole, What
Have We Learned from Three Decades of Methadone Maintenance Treatment?, 13 DRUG & ALCOHOL
REV. 3, 3 (1994); see also DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, ABOUT METHADONE 10 (2d ed. 2003) ("When used in
proper doses in maintenance treatment, methadone does not create euphoria, sedation, or an analgesic
effect."), available at http://drugpolicy.org/docUploads/aboutmethadone.pdf.
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However, it nevertheless rejected corrections officials' claim that
methadone could constitutionally be prohibited as contraband.
These methadone cases are, of course, not dispositive of the larger
issue of whether prison-based drug treatment is constitutionally required.
This is true not only because their outcomes are mixed but also because
they concern pre-trial detainees and not convicted inmates (and thus did
not apply the Estelle standard). Furthermore, they contemplate only one
relatively unique drug treatment modality (methadone maintenance).
These cases are important, however, because they illustrate the struggle
between the lay understanding of drug treatment as a supererogatory
luxury (or potentially a pretext for recreational drug use) and scientific
understandings of addiction as a medical disorder requiring treatment.
Unsurprisingly, more recent precedent suggests that as scientific
understanding of addiction advances, the courts may be growing more
amenable to integrating addiction into the law of the Eighth Amendment.
For instance, in Messina v. Mazzeo,so the court held that an allegation that
methadone was withheld from a prisoner who had previously been
prescribed methadone maintenance was sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. "[I]f, based on plaintiffs condition, it was a medical necessity
that he receive methadone immediately, then plaintiff has alleged. . .that
[prison staff were] deliberately indifferent to Messina's medical needs. "
Such a determination is only possible given the premise that drug
dependence is a medical condition worthy of treatment.
Of course, methadone maintenance is only one modality of drug
treatment, and is somewhat unique in that it spares the addict the extreme
discomfort and pain of experiencing withdrawal. As such, it is admittedly
easier to see an Eighth Amendment injury when an inmate has been denied
methadone (especially if she was previously prescribed a maintenance
regimen) than where other forms of treatment have been withheld. 82 The
Supreme Court relied on a version of this logic when it held in 1974 that a
defendant's constitutional rights were not violated when he was excluded
from a diversion-to-treatment program because "there is no generally
accepted medical view as to the efficacy of presently known therapeutic
180. 854 F. Supp. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
181. Id. at 140.
182. Indeed, a potential reading of the current state of federal law is that corrections officials are
constitutionally required to treat the symptoms of withdrawal but not addiction itself. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F. 2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979); Pedraza v. Meyer, 919 F.2d 317 (5th
Cir. 1990). However, while these cases clearly establish a constitutional "floor" requiring officials at least
not to ignore the discomfort of an opioid-addicted inmate experiencing the withdrawal syndrome, they do
not pass on the question of whether addiction itself constitutes a "serious medical need."
303
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 14.2:271
methods of treating addicts and the prospect for the successful
rehabilitation of narcotics addicts thus remains shrouded in uncertainty.""
As a matter of constitutional law, the importance of this holding is strongly
diminished by the fact that it pre-dates Estelle and the development of the
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" standard. More
importantly still, it pre-dates a wealth of scientific evidence that various
treatment modalities can be effective. Empirical evidence supports the
effectiveness of an array of treatments, from cognitive therapies to training
in coping skills to behavioral and motivational therapies, provided the
treatments adhere to proven standards.'84 As such, while the suffering
prevented by methadone maintenance may be vivid, other treatment
modalities are equally valid responses to the medical harms of addiction.
In short, "[c]ourts should not be afraid to step out of narrow methadone
precedent and examine. . . dependence disorder in a new light, as a
medical illness requiring [treatment] rather than a moralist debate."8
All evidence-based drug treatment modalities are ultimately
assimilable to the "deliberate indifference" view of Eighth Amendment
rights for prisoners. First, as noted above, the likelihood that a medical
omission in prison will result in future harm is sufficient to state a
deliberate indifference claim. Eliminating or refusing to implement
prison-based treatment constitutes a deliberate choice by officials to deny
treatment for a condition that is legally considered a disease and which has
been scientifically shown to escalate and cause immense harm when left
untreated. Second, the elimination of treatment programs is frequently
analogous to withholding methadone from a maintenance patient because
it amounts to the termination of treatment that a patient was already
receiving. The simultaneous decrease in prison-based treatment
availability and increase in imprisonment in the United States leads
inexorably to the conclusion that inmates who once received drug
treatment in the community or while incarcerated are denied it today.186
Finally, because the federal courts have widely recognized addiction as a
disease (even while questioning its exculpatory value with regard to
criminal intent), the Eighth Amendment should undermine objections to
prison-based treatment that cast it as a luxury. The logical conclusion
from both the case law on addiction and the science of drug treatment is
183. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 426 (1974).
184. CASA, supra note 27, at 42-43.
185. Rebecca Boucher, The Case for Methadone Maintenance Treatment in Prisons, 27 VT. L. REV. 453,
482 (2003).
186. See Bales, supra note 24, at 387-88.
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that addiction is a threat to health and is possible to treat. Maintaining
prison-based treatment programs might thus be seen as equally a matter of
constitutional law as it is one of public policy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has provided an overview of several competing models of
addiction, arguing that the American federal judiciary has largely
embraced the so-called "disease concept" while taking a more autonomy-
oriented view on the narrower issue of addicts' criminal culpability. It has
argued that given our legal system's understanding of addiction, current
jurisprudence regarding the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment suggests that failure to provide addicted inmates with
prison-based drug treatment may well be constitutionally problematic. It
has not yet, however, grappled with the important question of why so few
imprisoned addicts have access to needed treatment.
The decision as to which services are available in correctional
settings is foremost the province of legislators and administrators. In the
face of ever-diminishing government resources and continually growing
budgetary pressures, the notion that the Constitution contains a command
that prisoners receive drug treatment while incarcerated may seem far-
fetched and unrealistic. Both for those in charge of prisons and those
inside them, the question of prison-based treatment is less a question of
constitutional law than of utilitarianism. However, even from the
perspective of a pure cost-benefit analysis, treating addiction in
correctional settings makes sense. Numerous empirical studies have
demonstrated that drug treatment in jails and prisons, when properly
implemented, is cost-effective from a policy standpoint.' Moreover,
addicts who need help and do not get it-especially those most likely to
interact with the criminal justice system-are likely to suffer and die. In
fact, drug overdose is the number one killer of convicts released from
prison.'" Why, then, does there seem to be relatively little political will in
favor of prison-based treatment?
187. See generally, e.g., Kathryn E. McCollister et al, Long-term Cost Effectiveness of Addiction
Treatment for Criminal Offenders, 21 JUST. Q. 659 (2004); Kathryn E. McCollister, et al., Is in-prison
treatment enough? A cost-effectiveness analysis of prison-based treatment and aftercare services for
substance abusing offenders, 25 L. & POL'Y 62 (2003); J. D. Griffith, et al., A cost-effectiveness analysis of
in-prison therapeutic community treatment and risk classification, 79 PRISON J. 352 (1999); see also
CASA, supra note 27, at 6 (claiming that "for each additional year that a former inmate stays substance
free, employed and out of prison, society would receive an economic benefit of approximately $90,953, and
that therefore if treatment is effective for 10% of addicts, investing in treatment would pay for itself in
about a year).
188. CASA, supra note 27, at 60.
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Given the terrible suffering endured by many addicts, the social and
economic costs of addiction and drug-related crime to the public at large,
and the long history of the "disease concept" in America, we may wonder
why the provision of drug treatment to prisoners is at all controversial.
The answer lies in the profound stigma that continues to attach to drug
addiction in the United States. Despite the century-long history of the
"disease concept" in America, the idea that drug addicts bring upon
themselves all the misery they suffer continues to endure. The scientific
and medical community recoil at this characterization, arguing that
advances in genetics, neurochemistry, and social epidemiology show
convincingly that addiction is a disease logically indistinguishable from
diabetes or hypertension. A leading advocate of methadone maintenance,
for instance, has written:
On the issue of heroin addiction being "self-inflicted" and not
worth treating, it is useful to provide an analogy. A significant
number of cardiologists treat a large number of middle-aged
men who require coronary bypass operations. These individuals
are generally overweight, eating unhealthy food, and drinking
unhealthy amounts of alcohol in addition to smoking several
packs of cigarettes everyday [sic]. Should the cardiac surgeon
deny treatment to these individuals because their cardiac disease
is "self-inflicted" through years of neglecting their own health?
If an inmate in any system required critical health care for his
disease, should the officials deny him access to such care based
on perception of "self-infliction"? '
Such advocates are motivated by a passionate desire to extract from
science a normative influence on society and the law.
But can science truly tell us who is morally blameworthy and who is
not? Strong critics of the disease concept like Schaler who claim that
"addiction is a choice" are surely partly reacting in disgust to the
presumptuousness of the scientific establishment, which they view as
attempting to prove moral culpability (or lack thereof) with empirical
studies. This tension has long been present in the law, and indeed might
well explain why most courts have stopped short of permitting addiction to
suffice as a "mental disease or defect" defense in criminal trials. But does
it bear on the question of prison-based drug treatment? If addiction is
indeed a serious but treatable medical condition, then the issue of whether
189. Boucher, supra note 184, at 459 (quoting Mark W. Parrino, Methadone Treatment in Jail, AM. JAILS,
May/June 2000, at 10 (2000)).
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addiction is "self-inflicted" seems to be of little relevance. Even
autonomy-oriented critics of the strong-form "internal coercion" theory of
addiction can allow for the possibility that addiction is a disease while
severing this theoretical characterization from the conclusion that addicts
are not responsible for their actions. Indeed, "most mental and physical
diseases suffered by people who violate the criminal law, even severe
diseases, do not have. . .exculpating effects because they do not affect
agency concerning criminal activity."l90 How addiction bears on
culpability, in other words, may not be a question that science alone can
answer in a vacuum devoid of input from the law and social norms. But
this conclusion alone may not answer the right questions.
Perhaps, then, determining whether addiction is a disease simpliciter
is not the most fruitful approach to understanding whether withholding
treatment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. After all, disease is
merely the subjective experience of "dis-ease" on the part of the sufferer:
'Diseases' are not things awaiting discovery by researchers and
physicians. Instead, they are convenient short-hand descriptions
of illnesses experienced by patients that facilitate investigating
and selecting possible courses of treatment. But conceptions of
illness do not serve only medical purposes; scholars and
physicians alike have recognized that diseases are socially
constructed and mutable. Nosology and diagnosis can describe a
patient's health or illness experience only imperfectly. As with
language and other systems of classification, disease categories
are context-dependent and subject to manipulation.'9 1
The legal definitions and social implications of pain, hardship, and
illness are thus perhaps not the province of any objective science. But this
does not mean that the suffering of addicts, and the ability of treatment to
alleviate such suffering, is not a matter of empirical fact. Whether the
Constitution permits the government to turn a blind eye to this fact is a
question that implicates how seriously we take the guarantees of the
Eighth Amendment. As Justice Stevens wrote, concurring in one of the
Supreme Court's most recent elucidations of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause: "Society changes. Knowledge accumulates. We learn,
sometimes, from our mistakes. Punishments that did not seem cruel and
unusual at one time may, in the light of reason and experience, be found
190. Stephen J. Morse, Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility, 19 L. & PHIL. 3, 6 (2000).
191. Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 241,
243 (1999). Noah offers a far more in-depth discussion of the various ways in which medical and legal
concepts of illness are intertwined than can be developed here.
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cruel and unusual at a later time."l 92 More than a century's worth of
reason and experience have taught us that addiction can be torture and that
prison-based drug treatment can work. In Justice Stevens' words, "unless
we are to abandon the moral commitment embodied in the Eighth
Amendment,"' our society must bring such reason and experience to bear
on the law.
192. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. Id.
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